Three studies demonstrated that anticipated self-blame elicits more conservative decisions about risks that require trust than about otherwise economically identical risks that do not. Participants were more reluctant to invest money in a company when it risked failure due to fraud versus low consumer demand (Study 1), and to risk points in an economic game when its outcome ostensibly depended on another participant versus chance (Studies 2 and 3). These effects were mediated by anticipated self-blame (Studies 1 and 2). Additionally, participants who actually experienced a loss felt more self-blame when the loss violated their trust, and became even more conservative in subsequent risk decisions relative to participants whose loss did not violate their trust (Study 3). No support emerged for alternative explanations based on either the perceived probability of incurring a loss, or on an aversion to losses that profit others.
Sucker 7 Sevdalis & Harvey, 2007) . In Study 3, therefore, we examined people's actual reactions to trust violations resulting from risk decisions, taking steps to distinguish self-blame and perceived exploitation from mere surprise (contrast with Kerr, 1983) . Furthermore, unlike prior work (Vohs et al., 2007) , we compared self-blame after a trust violation to self-blame after an equivalent loss that did not violate trust.
Third, we examined how repeated risk decisions might reveal the motivational potency of trust violations. To the extent that people are highly motivated to avoid trust violations, incurring one should make them especially reluctant to risk incurring another. For example, after a friend reneges on a loan, one might be reluctant to loan money to a different friend, even if one believed that this first trust violation did not make a second one any more probable. By contrast, to the extent that people are relatively less motivated to avoid losses unrelated to trust, incurring a non-trust-violating loss might not have the same impact on future decisions. In Study 3, we tested the prediction that incurring a trust violation would increase aversion to subsequent risks requiring trust relative to risks not requiring trust -a "once bitten, twice shy" effect.
Study 1: Investing Study 1 tested the prediction that people would be less willing to invest money in a company when it risked failure due to fraud versus lack of consumer demand, even though the odds of failure were equal in both cases. Risking loss due to fraud requires trust because it makes one vulnerable to the selfish intentions of others, whereas risking loss due to consumer demand does not require trust. To address the possibility that the predicted effect would stem from aversion to others profiting from one's loss rather than from aversion to trust violations, Study 1 also included a condition in which a lost investment resulting from low consumer Sucker 8 demand would benefit others. We predicted that this condition would be insufficient to reduce willingness to invest. Finally, Study 1 tested the mediating role of anticipated self-blame.
Method Participants
Ninety-seven university students (65% female; M age = 19.98, SD = 1.51) completed Study 1 in conjunction with unrelated studies for which they received $8. (One additional participant was excluded for providing incomplete data).
Procedure
Participants completed a survey entitled "Financial Decision-Making." We first measured individual differences in risk preferences. All participants imagined that they had $100 to invest, and indicated in increments of $10 how much they would invest in a company whose only risk was that it "could fail because market forces prevent it from realizing its full potential for growth." Ostensibly, there was a 75% chance that the value of an investment would remain unchanged after one year, a 10% chance that it would double, and 15% chance that it would be lost entirely.
Next, participants imagined that they had never heard of the first investment opportunity and were asked to consider an investment in a different company. The "only risk" of this investment was that "the company could fail because consumers do not purchase enough of the company's products" (trust-not-required condition) or that "the company could be fake, set up by con artists to steal investors' money" (trust-required condition). A third condition (others profit) was identical to the trust-not-required condition, but also stated that, according to the investment agreement, the owners of the company would "keep your investment as a profit" if the company failed. In all conditions, the following probabilities were ostensibly "entirely Sucker 9
accurate" regarding the value of an investment in the company after one year: an 80% chance that it would not have changed, a 15% chance that it would have doubled, and a 5% chance that it would have been lost completely due to realization of the primary risk (i.e., fraud vs. low consumer demand).
As a measure of anticipated self-blame, participants indicated how they would react to losing a $100 investment in the company: how much they would regret their investment decision, feel upset with themselves, kick themselves, and feel foolish (1 = Not at all; 7 = Extremely; α = .88). Finally, participants indicated in increments of $10 how much of their $100 they would invest in the company.
Results

Primary analysis
A one-way ANCOVA indicated that, controlling for the measure of individual differences in risk preference (i.e., investment in the first company), the amount invested in the second company differed as a function of the manipulation, F(2, 93) = 4.97, p < .001. Planned orthogonal contrasts revealed the predicted pattern. Participants said they would risk less money when the investment required trust (M = $37.35, SD = 30.68) than in the two conditions in which trust was not required, F(1, 93) = 8.72, p < .005, d = .61. Also as predicted, participants said they would invest an equivalent amount in the two conditions that did not require trust, regardless of whether others would profit from a loss (M = $56.21, SD = 33.85) or not (M = $63.24, SD = 27.05), F(1, 93) = . 96, ns, d = .20 .
Mediation analysis
We next tested the mediating role of anticipated self-blame, including the mean-centered covariate from the ANCOVA in all analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986 ; see Figure 1 ). A first Sucker 10 regression equation confirmed that participants anticipated more self-blame when the investment required trust (coded as 2) than when it did not (other two conditions each coded as -1), b = .36, t(94) = 3.76, p < .001, d = .78. i A second equation in which self-blame was mean-centered showed that the more self-blame participants anticipated, the less money they wanted to invest, b = -7.61, t(93) = 3.72, p < .001, β = -.34, and that controlling for anticipated self-blame reduced the effect of the manipulation on investment amount to non-significance, b = -3.38, t(93) = 1.64,
34 (compare to b = -6.15, d = .61 when not controlling for self-blame). This reduction was significant by the Sobel test, z = 2.65, p < .01. In sum, the effect of the manipulation on participants' willingness to invest was significantly mediated by anticipated self-blame.
Discussion
Participants in Study 1 predicted that they would blame themselves more for losing an investment due to fraud (a trust violation) versus low consumer demand (not a trust violation).
As a result, they were more reluctant to invest in a company that risked failure due to fraud versus low consumer demand, even though the financial parameters of both investments (i.e., the probability and magnitude of losses and gains) were identical. The knowledge that company owners would profit from participants' loss was not sufficient to produce this relative reluctance to invest, suggesting that perceiving the investment as requiring trust was necessary.
A potential limitation of Study 1 is that even though we emphasized in all conditions that the risk of loss was 5%, participants may still have assumed that loss due to fraud was more probable than loss due to consumer demand. An additional limitation is that anticipated selfblame may have influenced decisions only because, in the service of testing for mediation, we Sucker 11 prompted participants to think about it before collecting the dependent measure (Crawford et al., 2002; Hetts, Boninger, Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000; Simonson, 1992) .
To address these two limitations, we randomly assigned 81 students to either the trustrequired or the trust-not-required conditions of Study 1, with two key modifications. First, participants were not asked to anticipate self-blame. Second, for both the individual difference measure and the dependent measure, participants indicated risk aversion by filling in the blank in a sentence stating that they would invest a fixed sum of money in the company ($500 or $1,000 -a variation that did not affect results) "only if there were at least a __% chance that the company would not fail" (9-point scale from 10% to 90%; negative skew corrected by reversing, logtransforming, and re-reversing the scale). We reasoned that this new measure would be sensitive to the perceived psychological cost of loss, but not to the perceived likelihood of loss occurring.
We also made two superficial changes to the Study 1 procedure. First, the trust-required condition stated that the only risk of the investment was that "the company could fail because its owners trick investors and steal their money." Second, for the company described before the manipulation (i.e., for the individual difference measure), investors would lose half their money if the company failed and double their money if it did not, whereas for the company described after the manipulation (i.e., for the dependent measure), investors would lose all their money if the company failed and quadruple their money if it did not. Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004) . As in Study 1, we predicted that participants would make less risky decisions when trust was at stake than when it was not, and that anticipated self-blame would again mediate this effect.
Method Participants
One hundred forty-five participants (66% female; 68% White, 17% Asian, 4% Latino, 4% Black; M age = 32.60 years, SD = 10.82, range = 18 to 64), recruited from an online subject pool, completed this Web study in exchange for a $5 gift certificate to an online retailer. (An additional 13 participants declined to respond to the primary measures, and one was excluded for taking 6.10 SDs above the mean time to complete the study; attrition did not significantly differ between conditions, χ 2 [1] = 1.54, ns). Highest level of educational attainment varied: 26% held advanced degrees, 21% held 4-year college degrees, 13% held 2-year college degrees, 14% were Sucker 13 currently enrolled in college, and 24% held a high school-level diploma and were not currently enrolled in college.
Procedure
In a "first study," participants imagined choosing between a sure thing of $2 versus a chance to receive either $4 or nothing, and indicated, in increments of 10% ranging from 10 to 100, the worst odds of receiving the $4 at which they would choose the gamble. We used this item as a covariate to control for individual differences in risk preference.
In a "second study," participants learned how to play a two-player trust game (referred to as "The Investment Game" and adapted from Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; see Camerer, 2003) .
Both players would receive 10 points (worth $.60 each). As Player 1 (P1), participants would first decide whether to "keep" their points, in which case both players would end the game with 10 points, or to "loan" the points to Player 2 (P2), in which case P2 would also receive 10 "bonus points" and the outcome of the game would depend on P2's move. This move would be either an "even split," in which case both players would end the game with 15 points, or an "uneven split," in which case participants would end with 8 points and P2 would end with 22 points. The diagram that summarized these rules for participants is shown in Figure 2 .
All participants were told that P2 was another participant, but we manipulated whether P2's move would be determined by his or her own decision (trust-required condition) or by a "random number" that was "generated by the website" (trust-not-required condition). In the trust-not-required condition, we emphasized that P2 had "no control" over how many points P1 would receive.
Measures Sucker 14
Comprehension check. Seven questions assessed participants' understanding of the rules of the game (i.e., which combination of moves would be best and worse for P1; how many points each player would end the game with for each combination of moves).
Self-blame. Participants used the four self-blame items from Study 1 to indicate how they would feel if, after loaning their points, they learned that P2's move was the uneven split (1 = Not al all; 9 = Extremely; α = .92).
(In Studies 2 and 3, participants also indicated how disappointed and upset they would feel about the game's outcome. These items correlated highly with the self-blame scale, and including them in the scale produced analogous results. To maintain consistency with the cleaner self-blame measure used in Study 1, however, Studies 2 and 3 omitted these items from the scale). Risk aversion. Finally, participants were asked to imagine that they were playing a single round of the game as P1, and to fill in the blank to make the following sentence true: "I would choose to loan my points to Player 2 only if there were at least a __% chance that [Player 2 would choose / the website would randomly select] an even split." 
Results
Comprehension and manipulation checks
Risk aversion
As predicted, participants were more risk-averse when P2's move would be determined by another participant (trust-required condition; M = 65.00%, SD = 22.38) versus by chance
ANCOVA that controlled for individual differences in risk preference.
ii
Mediation analysis
We predicted that anticipated self-blame would mediate the effect of the manipulation on risk aversion. The regression equations that tested for mediation included a dummy code for condition (trust-required = 1, trust-not-required = 0; Baron & Kenney, 1986) blame). This decrease was significant by the Sobel test, z = 2.69, p < .01. Thus, anticipated selfblame significantly mediated the effect of the manipulation.
Discussion
Study 2 produced two main results. First, it showed that participants were less willing to tolerate risk in an economic game when the other player's move was determined by another person than when it was determined by chance (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004) After experiencing a loss due to chance, people often make riskier subsequent decisions because of a motivation to recoup their loss (Leopold, 1978; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) . But the experience of a trust-violating loss, we propose, can offset this motivation with the motivation to avoid a second trust violation. We thus hypothesized in Study 3 that a) as in Studies 1 and 2, participants would make more conservative decisions when risk required trust than when it did not, and that b) building on Studies 1 and 2, experiencing a loss that violated trust would increase this relative conservatism -a "once bitten, twice shy" effect.
We tested these hypotheses in a two-round trust game whose outcome was ostensibly determined Sucker 17
either by chance (trust-not-required condition) or by another participant (trust-required condition). A secondary goal of Study 3 was to examine whether losses really do arouse more self-blame when they violate trust, as participants in Studies 1 and 2 expected that they would.
We thus measured how much self-blame participants felt after losing points on the first round of the game.
Method Participants
We recruited 51 participants (57% female; 56% White, 32% Asian; M age = 30.42 years, SD = 9.31; range = 18 to 54) from a subject pool to complete Study 3 on the Web in exchange for a $5 gift certificate to an online retailer. Highest educational attainment varied: 34% had advanced degrees, 10% had 4-year college degrees, 14% had 2-year college degrees, 20% were currently enrolled in college, 18% held a high school diploma and were not currently enrolled in college, and the remainder held less than a high school diploma.
Sucker 20
Other measures. Participants provided demographics, responded to free-response suspicion-checks ("What did you think the researchers were hoping to find?" and "Did you think anything was strange or unusual while taking these studies?"), and read a debriefing form.
Results
Exclusions
We excluded participants (five in each condition) who provided incomplete data, who expressed suspicion that P2 did not exist or that the game was rigged, or who took unusually long to complete the study (i.e., one participant who took 4.84 SDs above the mean time).
Comprehension and manipulation checks
Participants understood how to play the game, answering on average 14.10 of the 15 questions correctly (SD = 2.49), with no differences in comprehension arising between conditions, t(39) = .26, ns. Indicating that the manipulation had its intended effect, participants experienced the loss as more of a trust violation in the trust-required condition (M = 5.95, SD = 2.54) than in the trust-not-required condition (M = 3.26, SD = 2.78), F(1, 38) = 10.86, p < .005, controlling for the number of points lost.
Investment amount
Our primary hypotheses were that a) participants would invest fewer points when the round's outcome was ostensibly determined by another person (trust-required condition) than when it was determined by chance (trust-not-required condition), and that b) this difference would be especially pronounced in Round 2 (i.e., after participants had experienced a loss). As Figure 4 illustrates, the pattern of results fit the hypotheses. A 2 (trust: required vs. not) X 2 (Round: 1 vs. 2) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor revealed two significant main effects, indicating that participants risked fewer points when doing so required trust than 
Experienced self-blame
Participants' decisions about how many points to invest suggest that, as in Studies 1 and 2, they predicted that a loss would feel worse when another person caused it. Additional results supported our hypothesis that an experienced loss would indeed elicit more self-blame when another person caused it. After incurring a loss in the first round of the game, participants expressed more self-blame in the trust-required condition (M = 5.59, SD = 2.49) than in the trust-not-required condition (M = 4.07, SD = 2.20). Importantly, this condition difference was significant even when controlling for the fact that participants had lost more points in the trustrequired condition, F(1, 38) = 6.83, p < .05.
v Subjective probability
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The effects reported above remained significant after controlling for the measure of subjective probability. Indeed, subjective probability did not significantly correlate with investment amount in either Round 1, r(41) = .09, ns, or Round 2, r(41) = .22, p = .17. We therefore found no support for the possibility that the pattern of results obtained for either investments or self-blame could be explained by differences in how likely participants felt a negative outcome would be to occur.
Discussion
Conceptually replicating the results of Studies 1 and 2, participants in Study 3 were less willing to expose themselves to the risk of loss when doing so required trust. This finding was obtained in a paradigm in which participants made and expected to learn the outcome of nonhypothetical decisions with potential financial consequences. The fact that we obtained this finding without prompting participants to consider how a loss would make them feel suggests, like the follow-up to Study 2, that concerns about self-blame arose and influenced judgment spontaneously.
The primary goal of Study 3 was to build on Studies 1 and 2 by examining the motivational consequences of experienced trust violations. Consistent with our hypothesis that incurring a trust-violating loss would motivate more risk aversion than a non-trust-violating loss, the disparity in risk aversion increased after participants experienced a loss. Specifically, whereas a loss that did not violate trust seems to have bolstered participants' willingness to risk a similar loss, presumably in order to recoup their points (Leopold, 1978; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) , experiencing a trust violating loss produced no such increase in willingness to risk.
Apparently, the motivation to avoid a second trust violation was enough to counteract the motivation to recoup the lost points.
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Why did incurring a first trust violation increase the motivation to avoid incurring a second? One possibility is that participants predicted that a second trust violation would feel even worse than the first. This could arise from participants anticipating that allowing themselves to be "suckered" twice would make them seem more responsible for the violationsan intuition captured by the aphorism, "fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me." A second possibility is that participants did not predict that a second trust violation would increase self-blame, but rather anticipated that blaming themselves the same amount for two different decisions would represent more cumulative self-blame than they could tolerate.
Untangling these two possibilities must await future research. In either case, it appears that experiencing a trust-violating loss has different motivational consequences than experiencing a loss that does not violate trust.
Note that our measures of subjective probability did not support the alternative explanation that the loss in Round 1 made a loss in Round 2 seem more likely to occur. This alternative is rendered even more implausible by the fact that we told participants in both conditions that the probability of loss was 30%, and emphasized to participants in the trustrequired condition that each round was determined by the actions of a different participant. The outcome of the first round should thus have been equally (un)informative about the outcome of the second round in both conditions.
A secondary goal of Study 3 was to examine whether losses actually would arouse more self-blame when they violated trust. The results revealed that they did, providing an additional demonstration of the motivational potency of trust violations, and suggesting that participants who anticipated greater self-blame in the trust-required conditions of the present studies were right to do so.
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Taken together, the results of Study 3 reveal how people's reactions to risks that require trust unfold over time. People predict that they will kick themselves more for a loss when it represents a trust violation. Accordingly, they reduce their exposure to the risk of such a loss.
When they experience a loss, they actually do feel more self-blame when the loss represents a trust violation, and then act as if they were particularly motivated to avoid a second trust violation.
General Discussion
The present research demonstrated, in three ways, the motivational potency of viewing a risk decision as relevant to trust. First, we found evidence that people expect trust violations to result in greater self-blame than otherwise economically identical losses that do not violate trust and that, as a result, people make more conservative decisions about trust-related risks than about otherwise economically identical risks not related to trust. Specifically, Study 1 found that participants were more reluctant to risk incurring a loss caused by fraud (trust required) than one caused by consumer purchasing behavior (trust not required), while Studies 2 and 3 found a greater reluctance to risk incurring a loss caused by another person (trust required) than one caused by chance (trust not required). Studies 1 and 2 obtained direct meditational evidence that this reluctance to risk was explained by anticipated self-blame.
A second manifestation of the motivational potency of trust violations is that losses seem to arouse more self-blame when they violate trust. In Study 3, participants who lost an equivalent number of points in an economic game expressed more self-blame when the loss had been caused by another person as opposed to chance. Given this response to trust violations, people apparently have good reason to be wary of trust-related risks.
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Study 3 also provided a third demonstration of the motivational potency of viewing risks as relevant to trust. After incurring a loss, participants seemed eager to take on even greater risk in a subsequent decision -unless the loss had violated trust. This "once bitten, twice shy" effect occurred even though the first loss was designed to be non-diagnostic of the odds that a second loss would occur. Apparently, the motivation to avoid a future loss was greater when a prior loss represented a trust violation.
Alternative explanations
When making risky decisions, people consider both the magnitude and the probability of potential losses and gains. We have argued that participants' reluctance to risk losses that would violate trust arose from the greater disutility of such losses (specifically, greater self-blame).
Several observations argue against the alternative possibility that this reluctance to risk stemmed from perceptions that such losses were more probable. In Studies 1 and 3, we equated the probability of incurring a loss across conditions. Further, we measured subjective probability of loss in Study 3, and this measure was unable to explain the condition difference we observed. In Study 2, as well as the follow-up to Study 1, participants were willing to tolerate a higher probability of incurring a loss when loss would not violate trust -findings not easily explained by the subjective probability of a loss actually occurring. Finally, the meditational evidence in Studies 1 and 2 suggests that participants' concerns about the magnitude of loss fully accounted for the effects we observed. Thus, it seems highly unlikely that perceived probability of loss can explain our results.
We interpret our results as indicating that participants were more motivated to avoid loss when it would violate trust. A potential alternative is more cognitive than motivational.
Framing economic games as social interactions versus games of chance can affect players' Sucker 26 strategies by eliciting different decision heuristics -rules of thumb that guide decisions without much thought (Abele, Bless, & Ehrhart, 2004; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004) . In the trust-not-required condition of Studies 2 and 3, perhaps the knowledge that a random-number generator would determine the payoff cued a decision heuristic associated with games of chance, which made participants more willing to risk. Our findings cast doubt on this explanation. First, we observed the same pattern of results in the context of investing in stocks when the trust-notrequired condition involved risking loss due to low consumer demand (Study 1 and its followup). It seems unlikely that this manipulation would activate the same decision heuristic as the manipulation in Studies 2 and 3. Second, a purely cognitive explanation would struggle to explain the mediational data we obtained in Studies 1 and 2. These data provide strong evidence for the motivational mechanism we have proposed.
Contributions to the literature
Our studies enrich prior theory and research on trust and on the sucker effect. Whereas prior work is consistent with the idea that people expect trust violations to add disutility to loss (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Kerr, 1983) , direct assessments of this fear and its role in decisionmaking have been lacking, allowing for alternative interpretations of the relevant findings. Our data fill this gap and advance a more precise understanding of the nature of the feared disutility, supporting the previously untested idea that a reluctance to trust can arise from anticipated negative affect directed towards the self (Vohs et al., 2007) and not just negative affect directed towards the trust violator (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003) . The present research also extends prior literature by examining reactions to the experience of incurring a trust-violating loss. The "once bitten, twice shy" effect illustrates that the impact of a loss on subsequent decision-making can depend on whether or not the loss is perceived as a trust violation. Additionally, examining Sucker 27 experienced trust violations allowed us to examine the question, unaddressed by prior research, of whether aversion to risks requiring trust stems from biased predictions of how trust violations would make one feel. We found that participants did feel more self-blame in response to losses that violated trust -in fact, just as much more as other participants had predicted (see Footnote   5 ).
The accuracy of participants' predictions has implications for the affective forecasting literature, which has focused on systematic errors people make when predicting the emotional impact of different events (see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003 , for a review). People seem to have different lay theories about which circumstances will amplify regret. Some of these theories are inaccurate, such as one that assumes that losses feel worse when they almost did not occur (Gilbert et al., 2004; Sevdalis & Harvey, 2007 ; see also Crawford et al., 2002; Fernandez-Duque & Landers, 2008) . But in other domains, the lay theories seem to be correct, as shown by people's accurate estimates of how much regret they will feel in response to losing simple gambles (Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999) . Our findings suggest that trust is a domain in which the lay theory aligns with reality. This alignment may be coincidental, but it may also speak to the psychological importance of the domain of trust. For example, accuracy might arise from a tendency to ruminate about past experiences with trust violations more than past experiences with other kinds of loss. To explore this possibility, future research should test whether people can accurately predict their reaction to different operationalizations of trust violations. It also remains to be seen whether people overestimate the duration of self-blame, as they do with other emotions in other domains (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) .
When will people trust?
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In the present studies, the risk of a trust violation elicited more conservative decisions, but several processes may sometimes counteract this phenomenon by offsetting the anticipated pain of a trust violation. First, risks that require trust are often accompanied by promises and assurances that may increase confidence that the risk will pay off. Second, social norms prescribing trust may sometimes make the anticipated pain of being too cynical outweigh the anticipated pain of feeling like a sucker (Deutsch, 1973) . Third, the anticipated pleasures of trusting wisely -such as affirming one's connectedness to others -may sometimes counteract the anticipated pain of trusting too well. Fourth, people may sometimes trust automatically without considering the costs and benefits of gains and losses (Messick & Kramer, 2001 ). Each of these processes seems most likely to operate within close relationships in which trust is assumed, as opposed to the kind of interactions with strangers examined in the present studies.
We suspect, however, that even in the context of close relationships, the concern about feeling like a sucker can sometimes make people hesitate before trusting.
Why are trust violations so aversive?
There could be a number of reasons why people tend to kick themselves more when a loss represents a trust violation. One possibility is that people assume that permitting their own exploitation tends to invite further exploitation. Falling prey to one con artist may make one a desirable target for other con artists, whereas losing money in the stock market does not similarly increase one's vulnerability to future investment losses. A related possibility is that trust violations have especially self-threatening implications. People may fear that having made themselves vulnerable to exploitation may signal to themselves and others that they are the kind of person who can be exploited (i.e., a sucker rather than merely someone who has exercised poor judgment). A different kind of explanation stems from the idea that heightened aversion to Sucker 29 trust violations is functional in that it motivates people to avoid falling prey to the exploitative intentions of others (cf. Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006) . This aversion could have resulted from adaptation to evolutionary pressures (Cosmides, 1989; Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002) , but could also arise from the experience of navigating comtemporary society, in which it continues to be crucial to trust wisely and not too well.
Conclusion
People are more motivated to avoid material loss when they perceive such loss as a trust violation. Trust-violating losses are painful not only because they affect one's wealth or material resources, or incite anger at others, but also because they arouse self-blame. Anticipating this self-blame, people are more reluctant to expose themselves to risks that require trust than to otherwise identical risks that do not -even when both types of risk are equally likely to end in loss and to profit other people. Incurring a trust violation further magnifies this relative reluctance to risk. ii With equal variance not assumed, p < .05. iii Before beginning the main part of study, participants completed four items from the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967) . As these items showed poor internal consistency (α = .56) and did not correlate with our dependent measures, they are not discussed further.
iv With equal variance not assumed, the Round 1 and 2 differences were reliable at p = .06 and p < .005, respectively.
v An additional 41 participants predicted how they would feel after incurring the game's unfavorable outcome. Unbeknownst to them, the number of points that each participant imagined losing was equal to the number of points that one of the 41 participants in Study 3 had lost. As in Studies 1 and 2, predicted self-blame was higher in the trust-required condition (M = 5.48, SD = 2.31) than in the trust-not-required condition (M = 3.66, SD = 2.34), F(38) = 14.56, p < .001, controlling for the number of points lost. Comparing these predictions to the degree of self-blame actually experienced by Study 3 participants reveals striking accuracy. Note: Both players begin the game with a 10-point endowment.
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Trust not required
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